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Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother: 
But Court-Ordered Grandparent Visitation in 
the Intact Family? 
Laurence C. Nolan* 
Children's Children are the crown of old men; and the 
glory of children are their fathers. 
Proverbs 17:6 
I. INTRODUCTION 
American family law has consistently protected the intact 
family from interference by the state, especially in childrearing 
decisions. Beginning in the 1960s, states began enacting 
statutes which abrogated the common law rule 1 that 
grandparents had no legally enforceable right to visitation of 
grandchildren. This rule, as articulated in Succession of Reiss2 , 
was based on several principles. It was a parent's moral, not 
legal, obligation to allow grandparent visitation. Court-ordered 
grandparent visitation would undermine the parents' right to 
rear their children as they think best. The state's intervention 
in family disputes would make them more pronounced by 
making them public. 3 
* Associate Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. B.S., 
Howard University, 1961; J.D., University of Michigan School of Law, 1974. I am 
grateful to Charla Zeller, a third year law student, for her research assistance, to 
Professor Warren Rosmarin, our law librarian, for his technical assistance, and to 
Professor Mary B. Wyatt, Professor Madelyn Squire and George H. Nolan for their 
helpful comments. I presented an earlier version of portions of this article at the 
International Society of Family Law's North American Regional Conference on 
Family Restructuring at the End of the Twentieth Century, held at Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming, in June, 1993. 
1 Emanuel S. v. Joseph F., 377 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 1991). 
2 15 So. 151 (La. 1894). This case is regarded as the first case litigating 
grandparent visitation, although it interprets the civil law and involves a lawsuit 
by the maternal grandparent against the father for visitation with her 
grandchildren, the children of her deceased daughter. 
3 ld. 
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Today, all states, except the District of Columbia, have 
enacted grandparent visitation statutes, allowing grandparents 
to petition the court for visitation under certain circumstances 
against the wishes of parents.4 Until recently, most statutes 
excluded visitation rights within the intact family. There is 
now a trend5 to extend grandparent visitation statutes to the 
traditional intact family. 6 
Forced grandparent visitation may erode the stability of a 
family that is intact. Little empirical data is avaliable to assess 
the merits of grandparent visitation. 7 The Supreme Court of 
the United States has declined to rule on the constitutionality 
of court-ordered grandparent visitation in the intact family. 8 
Therefore, it is imperative that state courts act to protect the 
intact family. This article argues that state courts, when 
deciding intact family grandparent visitation cases, must 
adhere to a standard that is closely tailored to continue the 
traditional policy of protecting the intact family from state 
interference. Part II of the article examines the competing 
interests of the intact family, parents, grandparents, 
grandchildren, and state. Part III contends that the standard 
for state intervention in grandparent visitation cases must be 
the traditional standard for state intervention in family life. 
Part IV makes several arguments for following the traditional 
standard. First, the reasons supporting the enactment of 
grandparent visitation statutes in the 1960s and 1970s are not 
relevant to grandparent visitation in the intact family. Second, 
4 A few cases had allowed visitation without a statute. See Henry Foster & 
Doris Freed, Grandparent Visitation: Vagaries and Vicissitudes, 23 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 643, 645-46 (1979). 
5 See, e.g., Visitation Rights - Grandparents: Hearings on H.B. 30-93 Before 
the Judiciary Committee, House of Delegates, State of Maryland Reg. Sess. 1-3 
(1993) (statement of Sheila E. Hixson, 20th District Delegate); Jeanne Dewey, 
House Gives Nod to Visitation Rights, MoNTGOMERY J., Feb. 17, 1993, at Al. 
6 The intact family in this article is defmed as the traditional, nuclear 
family composed of husband, wife and their biological children. 
7 W. Glenn Clingempeel et a!., Children's Relationships with Maternal 
Grandparents: A Longitudinal Study of Family Structure and Pubertal Status 
Effects, 63 CHILD DEV. 1404, 1404-05 (1992). 
8 The Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of any of the 
grandparent visitation statutes. In 1992, the Court declined to hear a case which 
interpreted the Kentucky statute and involved a traditional, biologically intact 
family in King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992). 
It also refused to hear a case which interpreted the Wisconsin statute and involved 
a step-parent adoption intact family in In re C.G.F., 483 N.W.2d 803 (Wis.), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 408 (1992). 
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the inherent problems of court-ordered visitation may be 
disruptive to the intact family. Third, court-ordered 
grandparent visitation, without compelling reasons, is an 
unnecessary disruption to the intact family. Finally, the 
traditional standard satisfies the constitutional standard for 
state intervention in the intact family. 
II. THE COMPETING INTERESTS 
In court-ordered grandparent visitation the interests of the 
intact family, parents, grandchildren, grandparents, and state 
usually clash because of the principle of family autonomy. This 
fundamental principle of family law serves to inhibit state 
intervention in intrafamily domestic disputes. This principle 
requires courts not to intervene to settle intrafamily domestic 
disputes except in certain specific circumstances and to protect 
the family from interference from others.9 
A. The Intact Family and Parents 
Historically, the principle of family autonomy has been 
applied to the traditional intact family. The family, as a unit, is 
autonomous and regulates its internal affairs. 10 The common 
law also protected the intact family even though a parent's 
rights might be sacrificed. For example, a child born to a mar-
ried woman was presumed to be the child of her husband even 
though he was not the biological fatherY Although the pre-
sumption was primarily to protect the child from the conse-
quences of illegitimacy, it also protected the integrity and au-
tonomy of the family unit. This presumption was so strong that 
it was very difficult to overcome. 
The principle of parental autonomy, usually used inter-
changeably with the broader concept of family autonomy, 12 
protects the right of parents to rear their children without state 
interference except in certain specific circumstances.13 Paren-
9 See Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 
MICH. L. REV. 177 (1916). 
10 McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 
So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1959). 
11 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989). 
12 Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The 
Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 
VA. L. REV. 879, 880 (1984). 
13 Odell v. Lutz, 177 P.2d 628, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947); Succession of Reiss, 
15 So. 151, 152 (La. 1894); Foster & Freed, supra note 4, at 643-53. 
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tal autonomy is justified on several grounds. First, under natu-
ral law principles, parental rights are part of the natural order 
of society, and parents are presumed to act in their child's best 
interest. 14 Second, parental autonomy promotes the nation's 
"commitment to diversity of views, lifestyles, and freedom of 
religion . . . by allowing families to raise children in a wide 
variety of living situations and with diverse childrearing pat-
terns."15 
Third, since there is no consensus as to what constitutes 
the healthy adult and because of the impracticality of judicial 
system supervision over childrearing, 16 a system promoting 
parental autonomy will as likely produce a healthy adult as 
any other one. 17 Thus, the principle of family autonomy pro-
tects both the intact family as a unit and the parent as an 
individual in the exercise of childrearing rights. It also benefits 
the state by supporting cultural intrafamily diversity. 
The principle of family autonomy is also constitutionally 
protected. The United States Supreme Court has consistently 
interpreted the Liberty Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to protect the parent's right to rear children without interfer-
ence from the state. 18 Beginning in 1965, Griswold v. Con-
necticut19 and its progeny have described family autonomy in 
terms of the right of privacy. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to define 
a family without state interference is also part of the right to 
privacy interest.20 This right extends to parents in the intact 
family. Although some of the recent Supreme Court cases may 
have weakened the biological parent's rights in childrearing, 
14 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 887. 
15 Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected'' Children: A 
Search for Realistic Standards, 27 STAN. L. REV. 985, 992 (1975). 
16 Id. 
17 Judith L. Shandling, Note, The Constitutional Constraints on 
Grandparents' Visitation Statutes, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 118, 127-29 (1986). 
18 The first cases were Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (rec-
ognizing that among the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment are the 
rights "to marry, to establish a home and bring up children"), and Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (stating "[t]he child is not the mere creature of 
the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations"). 
19 381 u.s. 479, 484-85 (1965). 
20 See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (allowing 
grandparent to define family with children and grandchildren); Loving v. Virginia, 
388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (allowing interracial couple to define family); Shandling, 
supra note 17, at 127-29. 
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those same cases have strengthened the constitutional protec-
tion of the integrity of the "family" as a unit. 21 In several cas-
es in which unwed fathers asserted their parental rights,22 the 
Court protected the family unit in which the child was a mem-
ber over the parental rights of the fathers. In the most recent 
case, the Supreme Court protected an intact family from the 
intrusion of an unwed father asserting parental rights when 
the mother and her husband wanted to continue as an intact 
family. 23 Thus, both the intact family as a unit and parents as 
individuals have constitutionally protected privacy interests. 
B. Grandparents 
Although grandparents are not asking to share legal custo-
dy of the grandchild, but merely to develop a relationship with 
the child, court-ordered grandparent visitation may intrude 
upon fundamental interests of the parents and the family. 
Under the common law doctrine of family autonomy, parents 
have the right to determine with whom the child develops a 
relationship and the right to define the boundaries of the fami-
ly.24 Grandparent visitation statutes have abrogated the com-
mon law and have created for grandparents an independent 
right to petition the court for visitation.25 A number of policies 
may justify these statutes. There are unique bonds and rela-
tionships, some argue, between grandparents and grandchil-
dren, which are mutually beneficial.26 In view of the general 
disintegration of the family, others argue, grandparent visita-
tion strengthens family bonds and preserves intergenerational 
contact.27 Others contend that grandparents' rights are deriva-
21 Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J. 
FAM. L. 393, 412-22 (1985-86). 
22 See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Rob-
ertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
23 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989). 
24 Shandling, supra note 17, at 126-27. 
25 Some statutes include great-grandparents. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 25-337.01(B) (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-103(a)(l) (Michie 1991); ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5 § 607(b)(1) (Smith-Hurd 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 257.022(2a) (West 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (Supp. 1993); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 1993). 
26 See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 631 (Ky. 1992); Mimkon v. Ford, 332 
A.2d 199 (N.J. 1985); Elaine D. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social Poli-
cies and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 295, 295-98 (1985); ARTHUR KORNHABER, 
M.D. & KENNETH L. WOODWARD, GRANDPARENTS AND GRANDCHILDREN 55 (1981). 
27 King, 828 S.W.2d at 631. 
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tive of their children's rights. Thus, when their normal access 
through their own children to their grandchildren is disrupted, 
they should still have visitation rights to assert. 28 Finally, 
some argue that this legislation's only justification is political: 
the inevitable result of intense lobbying efforts in all fifty 
states by grandparents and their supporters. 29 
Grandparents may also assert that their right to visitation 
is constitutionally protected under principles articulated in 
Moore v. City of Cleveland.30 The Supreme Court, in that plu-
rality decision, found a zoning ordinance unconstitutional be-
cause it defined "family" as essentially meaning the traditional 
intact family. The Court stated "[o]urs is by no means a tradi-
tion limited to respect for the bonds uniting the members of the 
nuclear family. The tradition of uncles, aunts, cousins, and 
especially grandparents sharing a household along with par-
ents and children has roots equally venerable and equally de-
serving of constitutional recognition."31 The grandparent's 
right to define the family to include access to the grandchild 
conflicts with the parent's right to define the family to exclude 
the grandparent. 
Grandparents may also assert a claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Consti-
tution if the state allows only certain grandparents to assert 
visitation rights. 32 It is, however, unlikely that the 
grandparent's right to visitation is itself a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The prevailing test for determining 
whether an interest is constitutionally protected requires the in-
28 Olds v. Olds, 356 N.W.2d 571, 573 (Iowa 1984); Kanvick v. Reilly, 760 
P.2d 743, 745 (Mont. 1988); Emanuel S. v. Joseph F., 577 N.E.2d 27, 28 (N.Y. 
1991). The disruption is typically the death or divorce of the grandparent's child. 
29 Andre P. Derdeyn, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Rendering Family Dis-
sension More Pronounced?, 55 AM. J. 0RTHOP5'YCHIATRY 277, 282-83 (1985); Ingulli, 
supra note 26, at 297; Ross A. Thompson et a!., Grandparents' Visitation Rights: 
Legalizing the Ties that Bind, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1217, 1218 (1989). 
30 431 u.s. 494, 505 (1977). 
31 Id. at 504. The court may limit this case to apply to those situations 
where the extended family member is actually living with the child. Rebecca 
Brown, Comment, Grandparent Visitation and the Intact Family, 16 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
133, 142 (1991). See also Michael J. Minerva, Jr., Grandparent Visitation: The 
Parental Privacy Right to Raise Their ''Bundle of Joy," 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 533, 
547 (1991); Shandling, supra note 17, at 128. 
32 Ward v. Ward, 537 A.2d 1063 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1987). Parents and 
grandchildren could also raise similar equal protection arguments. 
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terest to have been "deeply rooted in ... tradition".33 Histor-
ically, grandparents did not have a right to visitation; there-
fore, it would fail this test of constitutionally protected rights. 
C. The Grandchildren 
The law has not adequately delineated the right of children 
to visit parents, let alone to visit grandparents. It is, therefore, 
predictable that grandparent visitation statutes, following the 
pattern of parental visitation statutes, are in terms of the right 
of the grandparent, not of the right of the child. Arguably, the 
grandchild's interest is to know and associate with grandpar-
ents.34 Under our jurisprudence, however, minors usually do 
not act for themselves-others speak for them. Many states, 
nevertheless, allow children to state a preference in custody 
decisions. 35 The court typically considers the age and maturity 
of the child in determining what weight the court will give the 
child's preference in determining custody.36 Some states follow 
this approach in grandparent visitation statutes and allow the 
grandchild to state a preference.37 Conversely, the child's in-
terest, for his or her own healthy development, is to live in a 
stable, intact family environment without state interference.38 
D. The State 
The state's interest in court-ordered grandparent visitation 
stems from both its parens patriae power and its police power. 
Under the parens patriae principle,39 the state has an obliga-
tion to intervene to protect children under certain circumstanc-
es: when their parents have not met their parental duties; 
when the family is breaking up or has broken up; and when 
33 Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989). 
34 Lucchesi v. Lucchesi, 71 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. Ct. 1947). Foster & Freed, 
supra note 4, at 662, 675. 
35 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(3) (1993); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 722.23(i) (West 1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(1)(b) (1991); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Anderson 1989). 
36 Posey v. Bunney 561 P.2d 400, 404 (Idaho 1977); Rose v. Rose, 340 
S.E.2d 176, 178, 179 n.4 (W.Va. 1985). 
37 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-59 (West 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 752.01(2)(c) (West Supp. 1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402(5) (Vernon Supp. 1993); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125A.330(1)(0 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d(Il)(g) 
(1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1013(6) (1989). 
38 See tnfra notes 101-103 and accompanying text. 
39 See Lawrence B. Cusler, The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 
EMORY L.J. 195 (1978); Shandling, supra note 17, at 129. 
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there is a compelling public policy. The state then steps in and 
substitutes its judgment for the parent's, but only where the 
best interests and welfare of the child so demand. Presumably, 
in grandparent visitation cases the state intervenes and orders 
visitation in order to protect the child from the parent's deci-
sion to deny visitation. 
The state's interest in court-ordered grandparent visitation 
that stems from its police powers illustrates the conflicting 
state interests. "The police power is the state's inherent plena-
ry power both to prevent its citizens from harming one another 
and to promote all aspects of the public welfare."40 The state 
has established the family, traditionally the intact family, as a 
unit recognized by the government and has delegated to par-
ents the childrearing responsibilities.41 Thus, stable marriages 
and children being reared in intact families have historically 
been considered fundamental to the general welfare of the 
state. Grandparent visitation may be disruptive to both. 
The state also has a constitutional interest in court-ordered 
grandparent visitation since constitutionally protected funda-
mental rights are at stake if the state intervenes to order 
grandparent visitation. The United States Supreme Court 
views family autonomy as part of the fundamental right of 
privacy. Within the boundaries of family autonomy are the 
fundamental rights of childrearing and family definition. The 
Court requires that before the state can regulate fundamental 
rights, the state must have a compelling state interest and the 
regulation must be closely tailored to effectuate only the le-
gitimate state interest.42 
When the parties have competing interests, as there are in 
grandparent visitation litigation, the court's usual approach is 
to balance those interests.43 When the intact family is in-
volved, however, because of the importance of family autono-
my,44 the court usually does not engage in balancing without 
40 Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. 
REV. 1156, 1198 (1980). 
41 "Our jurisprudence historically has reflected western civilization concepts 
of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children." Parham 
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
42 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). See infra notes 107-116 and 
accompanying text. 
43 Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 410 A.2d 1052, 1058 (Md. 1979). 
44 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
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strong justification. Accordingly, if grandparent visitation stat-
utes extend to the intact family, the court must first decide if it 
should intervene to balance the interests.45 
Ill. THE TRADITIONAL STANDARD FOR STATE INTERVENTION 
The traditional standard for state intervention in family 
life under its parens patriae power begins with a determination 
that the child is harmed by the parent's decision, which in this 
case is the parent's decision not to allow visitation.46 This 
standard of showing harm has consistently been used in abuse 
and neglect cases47 and in custody cases between parent and 
nonparent. 48 In the latter, this standard is phrased in the 
more familiar language of the "unfitness" of the parent.49 The-
oretically, the "unfitness" of the parent causes harm to the 
child.50 If no harm is shown, then there is no basis for state 
intervention.51 In determining harm to the child in custody 
cases, the court must find that the parent's decision fails to 
meet the minimum standard of care, not the best standard. 
Mter the court determines that the child is harmed, the court 
must then determine whether placing custody with the 
nonparent will best address the harm and be beneficial to the 
child.52 Thus, before the state legitimately intervenes in fami-
ly life, this two-step standard should be met. 
This two-step standard should be applied to grandparent 
visitation cases in the intact family because these cases are 
45 Some argue grandparent visitation statutes go too far if they include the 
intact family. Bartlett, supra note 12, at 958-62. The Illinois General Assembly 
amended its grandparent visitation statute to include the intact family in 1989, but 
repealed the amendment in 1991 at the urging of the Illinois Bar Association. The 
Bar argued that the statute unduly burdened parents' childrearing rights. Brown, 
supra note 31, at 133. 
46 The threshold for state intervention in parental decisions is that the child 
is harmed by the parent's decision. This standard should be used in all grandpar-
ent visitation cases, not only the intact family, because all abridge parental autono-
my. See Bean, supra note 21, at 394-407, for a comprehensive discussion of the 
threshold for state intervention in a parent's decision not to allow visitation. See 
also Minerva, supra note :n, at 549; Wald, supra note 15, at 1004-07. 
4 7 Minerva, supra note 31, at 549, 553-54. 
48 Ex parte Mathews, 428 So. 2d 58 (Ala. 1983). 
49 ld. at 59. 
50 The parental preference doctrine and the presumption that custody should 
be awarded to the parent instead of a third party are other statements of this 
standard for awarding custody in parent-nonparent custody cases. See, e.g, Odell v. 
Lutz, 177 P.2d 628 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947). 
51 Schuh v. Roberson, 788 S.W.2d 740, 741 (Ark. 1990). 
52 Bean, supra note 21, at 424-25. 
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akin to custody cases between parent and nonparent.53 The 
threshold for court intervention requires that (1) denial of visi-
tation harms the child and (2) that the level of the harm war-
rants intervention. That the child would be better off with 
grandparent visitation is neither a threshold harm, as Profes-
sor Kathleen Bean has perceptively written,54 nor is it the rel-
evant issue. The court must identify the particular harm that 
deprivation of grandparent visitation causes a particular child. 
Once the harm has been identified, the court intervenes in the 
best interest of the child to determine whether court-ordered 
grandparent visitation is necessary to remedy the harm and 
would be beneficial to the child. 55 The court should not inter-
vene in the intact family simply because grandparent visitation 
is beneficial per se.56 Without first finding harm, the state 
would be substituting its judgment for that of the parent. 57 
Only after the court determines that denial of grandparent 
visitation will harm the child should the court then evaluate 
whether the intrusion will remedy the harm. 
This two-step analysis is the appropriate standard for 
determining court-ordered grandparent visitation in the intact 
family. Most courts, however, begin and end the analysis of 
grandparent visitation with the assumption that grandparent 
visitation is in the best interest of the child.58 Courts omit al-
together the crucial analysis as to whether the state should 
intervene.59 Courts may have unwittingly omitted this crucial 
analysis because grandparent visitation statutes are often cast 
53 Grandparent visitation cases involve litigation between a parent and a 
nonparent. When the intact family is involved, the nonparent is always a parent of 
one of the grandchild's parents. 
54 See Bean, supra note 21, at 423-30. One dissenting judge stated that in 
custody cases, showing general improvement in the child's life if custody were 
awarded to a third party is not enough to deprive a parent of l!Ustody. A parent 
was deprived of custody only if it was shown by clear and convincing evidence that 
the parent was unfit. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 684 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., 
dissenting). 
55 Bean, supra note 21, at 394-95. 
56 Id. at 483; King, 828 S.W.2d at 634 (Lambert, J., dissenting). 
57 The state initially delegates childrearing responsibilities to parents. The 
state does not take away these responsibilities unless the child is harmed. As 
Professor Bean has stated: "For the state to delegate to the parents the authority 
to raise the child as the parents see fit, except when the state thinks another 
choice would be better, is to give the parents no authority at all." Bean, supra 
note 21, at 441. 
58 ld. at 430. 
59 See, e.g., King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (1992). 
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in terms of the best interest of the child.60 The best interest 
standard is not the appropriate standard because this standard 
is generally used to settle disputes between parents, not dis-
putes in which a third party is interfering with a parent's deci-
siOn. 
On the other hand, the best interest standard is the appro-
priate standard between parents, because the competing inter-
ests of the parents "[t]end to cancel each other leaving only the 
interests of the children as relevant considerations."61 The in-
terests of grandparents and parents are not comparable and do 
not tend to cancel each other out. If the best interest standard 
were used without first showing harm, any interested person 
could request custody of or visitation with the child because he 
or she could demonstrate the child would be better off. The 
state delegates childrearing responsibilities to parents and does 
not take them away unless the child is harmed. 62 
A few statutes require the existence of a substantial rela-
tionship between grandchild and grandparent before the grand-
parent has standing to petition the court for visitation.63 But 
these statutes still do not focus on the issue of whether to in-
tervene. Although requiring a substantial relationship implies 
that grandparent visitation is not accepted as being beneficial, 
per se, a substantial relationship does not necessarily mean the 
child is harmed if visitation is denied. In an attempt to limit 
the judge's discretion under the best interest standard, a few 
statutes explicitly define the factors that a court should consid-
er when determining grandparent visitation.64 
Even if applicable, the best interest standard is frequently 
misapplied by the courts. Although the burden should be on the 
grandparents to prove visitation is in the child's best interests, 
60 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(1) (West/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-102(2) (1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-301(a) (1992). 
61 In re Marriage of Hruby, 748 P.2d 57, 63 (Or. 1987). 
62 Bean, supra note 21, at 424. 
63 See; e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1993); IOWA CODE § 598.35 (West Supp. 
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1992). The Minnesota statute requires 
visitation be in the best interests of the child and not interfere with the parent-
child relationship. 
64 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(2) (West Supp. 1993); NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 125A.330(1) (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17-d (1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15, § 1013(b) (1989); VA. CODE. ANN. § 20-107.2 (Michie Supp. 1993). The best 
interest standard is criticized because it is so broad that it gives too much discre-
tion to the judge. Statutes which delineate the factors which the court must deter-
mine when applying the best interest standard are attempting to curb the judge's 
discretion. 
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courts have usually assumed that grandparent visitation is in 
the best interest of the child. This assumption, in most cases, 
has become, in effect, a legal presumption in the course of the 
court's analysis. As a result the parent must prove visitation 
would be harmful.65 Courts have lost sight of the fact that it 
is the parent who has a right to uninterrupted custody.66 
The traditional standard puts the burden where it rightful-
ly belongs. The grandparent must show that denial of visitation 
harms the child, granting visitation is necessary to remedy this 
harm, and that visitation is beneficial to the child. Thus, if 
court-ordered grandparent visitation is extended to include the 
intact family, courts should determine these cases by applying 
the traditional standard for state intrusion in family life. 
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR FOLLOWING THE TRADITIONAL STANDARD 
Heretofore, state legislatures may have intuitively recog-
nized the potential harm that grandparent visitation may cause 
to the stability of an intact family and omitted the intact family 
from grandparent visitation legislation. The state's interest in 
the stability of intact families outweighs other considerations. 
Nevertheless, if the trend to include all family structures in 
grandparent visitation legislation continues, the following argu-
ments support the contention that courts should interpret this 
legislation by applying the traditional standard for state intru-
sion in family life. 67 
A. Reasons Supporting the Early Grandparent Visitation 
Statutes Are Not Relevant to the Intact Family 
Grandparent visitation statutes evolved because of a dis-
ruption in the intact family by death, separation, divorce or a 
65 In King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992), the court reasoned that "if a 
grandparent is physically, mentally, and morally fit, then a grandchild will ordi· 
narily benefit from contact with the grandparent." ld. at 632. The court found that 
the child would be safe in the grandparent's home and upheld grandparent visita-
tion in this intact family. One dissenting judge chided the court for finding that 
the grandfather presenting such evidence had met his burden of proof under the 
best interest standard. ld. at 635-36 (Wintersheimer, J., dissenting). 
66 Bean, supra note 21, at 398. 
67 Some have argued parental rights should not be absolute but should be 
guided by the traditional test for state intervention. See Bean, supra note 21, at 
405. Subjecting all families to grandparent visitation would also meet the Equal 
Protection argument because all families would be treated equally. See infra note 
117 and accompanying text. 
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custody proceeding. The first generation statutes provided 
standing for grandparents to petition the court to visit with 
their deceased child's children.68 The second generation stat-
utes, 69 following on the heels of the divorce rate explosion in 
the 1970s, expanded to include standing for grandparents to 
petition the court for visitation when their children did not 
receive custody of the grandchildren in separation, divorce, and 
custody cases. 70 
The premise for these statutes was that the normal chan-
nel, through which grandparents have access to grandchildren, 
is through their own children. When a child dies or becomes 
the noncustodial parent in divorce, separation and custody 
cases, the grandparent's access to the grandchild is often cut 
off. These statutes create an access channel. Such statutes are 
consistent with the principle that courts will not interfere with 
an intact family unless it is broken. 71 Statutes allowing grand-
parent visitation in an intact family are radically out of step 
with this fundamental principle. Families that have remained 
intact, despite the national decline in traditional family struc-
tures, should be spared any intrusion that might weaken or 
break them. 72 
68 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West Supp. 1967); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 
110 1/2, para. 11-7 (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.27a (West Supp. 1977-
78); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9.2-7.1 (West 1971); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (Consol. 
1966). 
69 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 197.5 (West Supp. 1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 
40, para. 607(b) (1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 1973); see also Bush v. 
Squellati, 522 N.E.2d 1225, 1226-27 (Ill. 1988) (discussing how the Illinois grand-
parent visitation statute evolved). 
70 Many of the second generation statutes have been revised to give 
standing to all grandparents in separation, divorce and custody cases. 
71 The problem with these statutes is that courts still fail to make the anal-
ysis as to whether the family is so broken that the child is harmed by denial of 
grandparent visitation, and granting visitation will alleviate this harm and be 
beneficial to the child. 
72 There is also the question of court-ordered visitation of the biological 
grandparents in the intact adopted stepparent family (the child's stepparent adopts 
the child) and the intact stranger adopted family (the adopting parents are not 
stepparents to the child). Prior to their creation, the adopted child most likely 
came from a broken home where the state traditionally intervened. Biological 
grandparents may have already been awarded court-ordered visitation prior to the 
adoption. It may be detrimental to the child to discontinue visitation after the 
adoption. Under the theory that grandparent rights are derivative from their own 
children, grandparents should cease to have rights when their children's rights 
have been terminated. In adoption cases, parental rights are terminated. Many 
states do not follow this theory of derivative rights in stepparent adoption cases 
and allow court-ordered visitation for the biological grandparents. However, in most 
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There is also support in behavioral science literature that 
early grandparent visitation statutes reflect the traditional 
standard. Studies show that a child, whose family has been 
disrupted because of the death of a parent or of a divorce, is 
often harmed if grandparent contact is not continued.73 The 
problem with these statutes is that they assume that harm 
occurs in every case and need not be proved on a case-by-case 
basis. The better, more consistent and more appropriate ap-
proach would be to apply the traditional standard in every 
grandparent visitation case. This approach would preserve the 
principles of family autonomy and would protect the child. 
B. Inherent Problems in Court-Ordered Visitation 
The problems inherent in court-ordered visitation would be 
disruptive to the intact family. 74 The initial problem the fami-
ly faces in court-ordered visitation is determining the frequency 
and length of the visits. Usually, "reasonable visitation" is the 
statuatory language for determining the frequency and length 
of visitation in custody decisions for the noncustodian. 75 Ac-
cordingly, courts in many of these cases have ordered an 
amount of time that is equivalent to a noncustodial parent's 
visitation. There is no analysis in these cases that indicates the 
amount of visitation was ordered because it was the amount 
needed to remedy the harm caused by the denial of visitation. 
Courts have merely assumed that grandparents should have 
this amount of time.76 Moreover, the cases usually fail to ana-
lyze the effect the visitation will have on the intact family 
unie7 and fail to address the critical problems concerning the 
states biological grandparents do not have court-ordered visitation rights in the 
stranger adopted case. 
73 lngulli, supra note 26, at 311. 
74 These problems are continuing sources of conflict between parents in 
many custody cases. 
75 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 32-1008 (1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 405.021(1) 
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 452.402 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 458:17-d(l) (1993); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 14-09-05.1 (1993). 
76 Broadus v. Broadus, 217 So. 2d 811 (Ala. 1969) (first and third weekends 
and other times); Kewish v. Brothers, 181 So. 2d 903 (Ala. 1966) (two days every 
other weekend); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992) (a 17-month old child in 
an intact family, visitation with her grandfather twice a week from 4 p.m. to 6 
p.m. on each Wednesday and Saturday); Pacell v. Birkmire, 24 Phila. Co. 468 
(Phila. Fam. Ct. 1992) (every other Sunday noon to 3:45 p.m.). But cf Leach v. 
Leach, 306 P.2d 193 (Kan. 1957) (a weekend each 60 days); Schampp-Cook v. 
Cook, 455 N.W.2d 216 (N.D. 1990) (one weekend per month). 
77 Courts may discuss or minimize the level of hostility between the adults, 
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parents' control over the actual visitation. Decisions as to what 
can, should, and does occur during visitation, go to the essence 
of parenting. It is the parents and not the courts who should 
decide to whom and what to expose their children unless the 
decision results in harming the child. 78 
Further disruption may occur to the family because courts 
usually enforce visitation orders through their powers of con-
tempt. If the parents refuse to obey the order, the ultimate 
penalty for such parents may be incarceration in the county jail 
until they comply. On the other hand, parents may dispute 
between themselves about obeying the visitation order. Such 
parental disputes are disruptive to family life and are ultimate-
ly unhealthy for the child. 
Typically, a visitation order cannot be modified without 
court approval. 79 The intact family's normal activities, such as 
moving from one place to another or disciplining the child, may 
be subject to court approval if they interfere with grandparent 
visitation. Modification usually means litigation even if it were 
at the parents' instigation. Litigation is costly and is disruptive 
to the family. Thus, the inherent problems of court-ordered 
visitation may be so onerous that the benefit of grandparent 
visitation, even when intended to remedy a harm that has been 
identified by the court, may be canceled out by its overall dis-
ruptive impact on the intact family. It is likely that a child is 
far better off to live in an intact family than to have the intact 
family break up because of grandparent visitation issues. 
C. No Compelling Reasons Unless Harm Is Shown 
The state has used the principle of family autonomy to 
protect the privacy and integrity of the family from disruption 
by others unless there are compelling reasons.80 Behavioral 
science literature has been important in helping courts to de-
cide custody decisions, to understand childhood development 
generally and also to understand a particular child in a specific 
but not the effect the hostility may have on the child. Cf King, 828 S.W.2d at 631 
(Wintersheimier, J., dissenting). The Minnesota statute requires that visitation be 
in the best interests of the child and not interfere with the parent-child relation-
ship. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1992). 
78 See King, 828 S.W.2d at 635 (1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting); Bean, supra 
note 21, at 446-47. 
79 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 257 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. 1979). 
80 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Prince v. Massachusetts, 
321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
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case.81 This literature would be helpful in deciding grandpar-
ent visitation cases as well.82 The principle underlying grand-
parent visitation is that the ties between grandparent and 
grandchild should be maintained because there is a special 
relationship between them that is beneficial to the child.83 
Nevertheless, there is insufficient behavioral science litera-
ture on the grandparent-grandchild relationship to reach a 
conclusion that court-ordered grandparent visitation is in the 
best interest of the child.84 Researchers are just beginning to 
study this relationship. The study by Dr. Arthur Kornhaber 
and Kenneth Woodward in 1981 concluded that: (1) children 
who have close relationships with a grandparent, unlike chil-
dren who do not, are emotionally secure; and (2) there exists a 
bond between grandparent and grandchild which is stronger 
than any other except the parent-child bond.85 This study has 
been criticized, however, for its methodological weaknesses and 
because other researchers have not been able to replicate the 
results. 86 In addition, other empirical studies which have been 
done do not support the conclusions of Kornhaber and 
Woodward.87 Another researcher has concluded that studies 
reported in 1984, 1986 and 1987 show that the direct and indi-
rect influences of grandparents on their grandchildren's devel-
opment depended on a number of factors, including, geograph-
ical proximity, age and gender of grandparent and grandchild, 
health status, socioeconomic conditions, and marital status of 
the grandparent.88 The most significant factor, however, was 
the quality of the relationship between the grandparent and 
the parent of the grandchild. 89 If this is true, then court-or-
dered grandparent visitation would be counterproductive and 
81 See generally Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses of Social Sci-
ence Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987 WIS. L. 
REV. 107. 
82 Ingulli, supra note 26, at 298. 
83 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
84 See Ingulli, supra note 26, at 301-02; Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 281; 
Thompson et al., supra note 29, at 1218. 
85 KORNHABER & WOODWARD, supra note 26, at 55. 
86 Ingulli, supra note 26, at 299-300. But advocates for passage of grandpar-
ent legislation have frequently cited this study to legislators. See, e.g., supra note 5 
and infra note 99 for congressional committee action on grandparent legislation. 
87 Ingulli, supra note 26, at 300 n.34. The more reliable studies will eventu-
ally be those using grandchildren and grandparents who are participating or have 
participated in court-ordered visitation. 
88 Thompson et al., supra note 29, at 1219. 
89 !d. 
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needlessly stressful to all three generations. 
Psychological studies show that family stress and conflict 
are emotionally damaging to children.90 Grandparent visita-
tion litigation in the intact family involves conflict between the 
grandparent and the grandparent's own child. The grandchil-
dren may experience stress and instability from the undermin-
ing of parental authority and the conflicting loyalties to parent 
and grandparent. Studies also show that children's behavior in 
divorce cases improved if there is a reduction in family con-
flict.91 Moreover, lawsuits, per se, generate stress and con-
flict.92 The emotional and psychological costs of litigation are 
high. Findings of psychological studies about the parent-child 
relationship justify these costs, however, when parents and 
children are involved. There are no similar studies about the 
grandparent-grandchild relationship to justify such costs.93 
Furthermore, litigation depletes family financial resources, as 
well as its time and energy, often rendering the family incapa-
ble of defending itself from more financially secure grandpar-
ents. Because of these costs, parents may grudgingly settle the 
case and agree to visitation when they would ordinarily not 
agree. 
On the other hand, psychological studies indicate that 
children benefit from the continuity in grandparent relation 
when there has been a disruption in the family because of 
death, separation or divorce, or when the grandparent stood in 
loco parentis to the grandchild.94 These instances of continu-
ing contact support the traditional standard for state interven-
tion because the child is harmed if the contact is not continued 
and the continuing contact addresses the harm. Similarly, if 
the relationship between a grandchild and grandparent in an 
90 Although most of these studies are based on the effect of divorce on chil-
dren, studies also show that persistent conflict in the intact family is also damag-
ing. See JOSEPH GoLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE CHILD'S BEST INTERESTS 31-39 
(1979); JOAN WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN 
AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 215-21 (1980); Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282; 
Diane Carlson Jones, Parental Divorce, Family Conflict and Friendship Networks, 9 
J. Soc. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 219 (1992); James Peterson & Nicholas Zill, Mari-
tal Disruption, Parent-Child Relationships, and Behavior Problems in Children, 48 
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 295 (1986) (finding persistent conflict in intact families is 
also related to behavior problems). 
91 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 281. 
92 Jody George, Children and Grandparents: The Right to Visit, 8 
CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 1, 4 (1987). 
93 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282; Ingulli, supra note 26, at 326. 
94 GoLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 90; Ingulli, supra note 26, at 311. 
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intact family is such that the child will be harmed upon sepa-
ration and the continuing contact will address this harm, then 
the contact should continue. Nevertheless, the strength of the 
grandparent-grandchild relationship in the intact family is 
unlikely to justify visitation. Such visitation would more likely 
be an "onset of a new source or exacerbation of a chronic source 
of conflict."95 
Court-ordered grandparent visitation may impede the nat-
ural development of boundaries between parent and adult 
child. The behavioral science literature suggests that adult 
children must develop their own identities as parents and 
spouses. Part of this development is accomplished by the 
children's own parents relinquishing their parental status over 
them. This relinquishment is the natural course of the relation-
ship for both generations.96 The end result should produce 
better functioning parents for the grandchildren. Court-ordered 
grandparent visitation interferes with this process. 
Court-ordered grandparent visitation also changes how the 
family functions. Family disputes are traditionally settled by 
the family, not by the court. Parents, not grandparents, have 
childrearing responsibilities. Court imposed grandparent visita-
tion in the intact family interferes with these rights and duties. 
The enactment of grandparent visitation statutes, for the 
most part, is the result of intense political lobbying in all fifty 
states by grandparents and their supporters for their rights at 
the expense of the rights of others. 97 Their efforts have occurred 
almost as a silent revolution, and have transformed grandpar-
ent visitation law. Legislators have been sympathetic to the 
idea that grandchildren and grandparent have a unique bond 
which should be developed.98 Some commentators have as-
cribed the success of this lobbying to the political clout of this 
generation of grandparents and to legislators who wish to ap-
peal to an important voter group.99 In light of the fact that 
95 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282. 
96 ld. at 284. 
97 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282; Ingulli, supra note 26, at 297; Richard S. 
Victor, Grandparent and Stepparent Rights, 25 TRIAL 55 (1989). 
98 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282. 
99 Derdeyn, supra note 29, at 282. Both the House Select Committee on Ag-
ing and the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers have held hearings on 
grandparent visitation rights and recommended that the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws consider drafting a uniform law. See gen-
erally Grandparents: The Other Victims o( Divorce and Custody Disputes: Hearings 
Before the Subcomm. on Human Services nf the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th 
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these statutes emerged as a political movement and with little 
attention to the ultimate effect on parents and their children, 
courts must use the traditional two-part standard in deciding 
grandparent visitation cases. 
The importance of the intact family as an institution may 
override including the intact family in court-ordered grandpar-
ent visitation if such visitation would have a disrupting and 
destabilizing effect on the intact family. Although there is a 
growing body of data about how well nontraditional families 
can function in rearing children, 100 the studies do not contra-
dict the importance of the intact family. The various studies on 
aspects of child development are usually more favorable for 
children in intact families than for children in non-intact 
families. 101 Studies also show that children are better off 
when they do not experience stress and insecurity associated 
with divorce, separation and lawsuits. 102 Stress and instabili-
ty generated from grandparent visitation disputes may further 
weaken the stability of the institution of the intact family. 
Moreover, the policy of all fifty states is to preserve marriage 
and to promote family life. 103 Indeed, society has interests in 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1983); Grandparent's Visitation Rights: Hearings on S. Con. Res. 
40 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
100 See e.g.. Thomas J. Parish et a!., Evaluations of Self and Parents as a 
Function of Intactness of Family and Family Happiness, 16 ADOLESCENCE 203 
(1981); Helen Raschke & Vernon Raschke, Family Conflict and Children's Self-Con· 
cepts: A Comparison of Intact and Single-Parent Families, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 
367 (1979); John W. Santrock et a!., Children's and Parents' Observed Social Be-
havior in Stepparent Families, 53 CHILD DEVELOPMENTS 367 (1982). 
101 See Darin R. Featherstone et a!., Differences in School Behavior and 
Achievement Between Children from Intact. Reconstituted, and Single-Parent Fami-
lies, 26 ADOLESCENCE 105 (1992) (indicating students from intact family ranked 
highest); Robert D. Feiner et a!., Family Stress and Organization Following Pa-
rental Divorce or Death, 4 J. DIVORCE 67 (1980) (showing children with histories of 
parental divorce/separation seemed to be experiencing significant lower levels of 
educational stimulation from parents and having other problems than those from 
intact families or homes broken by parental death); John Guidubaldi & Helen 
Cleminshaw, Divorce, Family Health, and Child Adjustment, 34 FAM. REL. 35 
(1985) (health ratings for intact-family children, their parents and siblings were 
higher than ratings assigned to divorced-family children, their parents and sib-
lings); Roger L. Hutchinson et a!., The Effects of Family Structure on Institutional-
ized Children's Self-Concepts, 24 ADOLESCENCE 303 (1989) (reviewing, in addition to 
their study, other studies supporting the proposition that children in intact families 
have slightly higher self-concepts); Vernon R. Wiehe, Self-Esteem, Attitude Toward 
Parents, and Locus of Control in Children of Divorced and Non-Divorced Families, 
8 J. Soc. SERV. RES. 17 (1984) (indicating children from divorced families showed 
lower self-esteem, more negative attitudes toward their parents). 
102 See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
103 See, e.g, CoLO. REV. STAT. § 26-l8-105(l)(e) (1998); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
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maintaining formal marriage as a societal norm and in protect-
ing children to continue to live in an undisturbed intact family 
environment. 104 
D. Constitutional Standard 
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether 
the boundaries of court interference in family autonomy will be 
extended to include court-ordered grandparent visitation. Nev-
ertheless, the Supreme Court has consistently held that family 
autonomy is an area of family life in which the state cannot 
intervene. Since 1965, the Supreme Court has viewed family 
autonomy as part of the fundamental right of privacy. Within 
the boundaries of family autonomy are the fundamental rights 
of childrearing and family definition. The fundamental right of 
childrearing has protected parents and the intact family from 
interference by the state and third parties. No case has extend-
ed this right to a member of the extended family unless the 
member is the child's guardian. 105 Thus, grandparents do not 
have a protected constitutional right in childrearing. 
Under Moore v. Cleveland,106 however, the right of family 
definition is a constitutionally protected right within the right 
of privacy which both parents and grandparents may assert. 
The grandparents' right of family definition, however, is not 
equivalent to that of the parents' right of family definition 
because of the parents' protected right of childrearing. Part of 
the childrearing right is the parents' right to determine with 
whom the child visits. 
When the fundamental right of childrearing is at stake, the 
state's regulation limiting that right must be justified by a 
29 § 9001(b) (1992); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 4-401 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 71-3-127 (1993). 
104 In the words of Willima Galston: 
A healthy liberal democracy ... requires the right kinds of citizens, pos-
sessing the virtues appropriate to a liberal democratic community. A 
growing body of empirical evidence developed over the past generation 
supports the proposition that the stable, intact family makes an irreplace-
able contribution to the creation of such citizens, and thus to promoting 
both individual and social well-being. For that reason, among others, the 
community as a whole has a legitimate interest in promoting the forma-
tion and sustaining the stability of such families. 
William Galston, A Liberal-Democrattc Case for the Two-Parent Family, RESPONSIVE 
COMMUNITY, Winter 1990-91, at 14. 
105 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944). 
106 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
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compelling state interest, and the regulation must be narrowly 
drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at 
stake. 107 The traditional state standard for intervention in 
family life satisfies this standard. 108 The state should not in-
tervene in the intact family to order grandparent visitation 
unless the child is harmed by the parent's decision to deny 
visitation and the intervention to order visitation will alleviate 
the harm. Thus, the state's compelling interest to intervene in 
the intact family is to protect the child from harm. 
If protecting a child under the state's parens patriae power 
is a compelling interest of the state, the best interest standard, 
as applied by the states, is not the standard to use when the 
state is interfering with the parents' fundamental right of 
childrearing. The state's compelling interest is to protect the 
child from harm, not to arbitrate when the child will be better 
off. The best interest standard, as applied, omits altogether the 
analysis that before a state can interfere with a parental deci-
sion, there must be a determination that this decision fails to 
satisfy only the minimal standard of care, not the best stan-
dard.109 Moreover, the best interest standard diverts the 
court from critically analyzing what harm court-ordered grand-
parent visitation may cause a particular family unit and ulti-
mately its effect on the grandchild. In King v. King, 110 for ex-
ample, the court assumed that there is a special tie between 
grandparents and grandchildren and that the child was better 
off with visitation. 111 The court's opinion did not consider the 
potential harm to the child's family life with her parents, and 
as a result jeopardized both the family and the child. 
The state also has a compelling interest to protect the 
general welfare of its citizens. The institution of the intact 
family is basic to the state and may override even the state's 
interest in protecting the child. 112 In Palmore v. Sidoti, 113 
107 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
108 Bean, supra note 21, at 431-441; King, 828 S.W.2d at 431-441 (1992) 
(Lambert, J., dissenting). 
109 "The fundamental liberty ir,terest of natural parents in the care, custody, 
and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not 
been model parents." Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753. 
110 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 378 (1992). 
111 !d. at 631, 635. 
112 State court decisions usually focus only on the state's interest in the child 
under its parens patriae prerogative and not the state's interest under its police 
powers. 
113 466 U.S. 429 (1984). 
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the United States Supreme Court determined that the state's 
interest in the child's best interest, with only a showing of 
possible injury to the child, was not a compelling interest as 
compared to the policy of eradicating racial discrimination. 
Similarly, the state has a fundamental interest in maintaining 
the intact family, since it is viewed as the fundamental unit of 
the state and has traditionally been viewed as the best place to 
rear the child. 114 The likelihood is greater that the child will 
develop into a healthy adult when the family continues to exist 
as an intact family. 115 Thus, if the family is intact, arguments 
must be compelling before imposing court orders which may 
destabilize it. 116 
Grandparent visitation may also be constitutionally at-
tacked based on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. If court-ordered grandparent visitation is not 
allowed in the intact family, but allowed in non-intact families, 
states may be unconstitutionally discriminating against some 
grandparents, parents and families. All grandparent visitation 
cases impinge upon the fundamental right of childrearing. 
When a classification intrudes upon the fundamental right of 
childrearing, state regulation limiting the right is unconstitu-
tional if it is not justified by a compelling state interest and the 
regulation is not narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate 
state interests at stake. The traditional standard for state 
intervention in family life satisfies this standard. 117 Thus, if 
all grandparent visitation statutes included all families, the 
Equal Protection Clause issue would not be raised because all 
grandparent visitation would be treated similarly and submit-
ted to the same standard. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is probably no more painful situation than for adult 
children to be at odds with their parents over grandparent 
visitation. The court, however, is not the best forum to resolve 
this painful situation. The reasons articulated in Succession of 
114 Bartlett, supra note 12, at 882; Galston, supra note 104. 
115 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. 
116 Based on constitutional standards, the state may require a higher level of 
harm to the child in intact families than would be required in non-intact families 
because of the importance of the intact family. 
117 See supra notes 109-16 and accompanying text. 
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Reiss118 remain as valid today as they were in 1894. Court-
ordered grandparent visitation intrudes upon the traditional 
principle of family autonomy. It interferes with basic rights of 
parents to rear their children without state intervention unless 
the child is harmed by the parents' decision and such interven-
tion will address that harm. Court-ordered grandparent visita-
tion in an intact family may cause unnecessary stress and dis-
ruption, and may ultimately cause its demise. Thus, if a court 
must decide an intact family grandparent visitation case, the 
court must apply the traditional standard for state interven-
tion. 
118 15 So. 151 (La. 1894). 
